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Local Government Finance as
Integrated System: The Uneasy Case
for Using Special Districts in Real
Estate Finance (A Response to Odinet’s
Super-Liens to the Rescue? A Case
Against Special Districts in Real Estate
Finance)
Darien Shanske*
Abstract
Local governments have long used special financing districts
to build infrastructure. If a local project, say building a pocket
park, is likely to increase the values of properties very close to the
park, then why should those properties not pay for the park in the
first place? Though efficient and fair in many cases, the use of
these districts can also be problematic. For instance, it seems
likely that wealthier residents, with higher property values to
leverage, are especially likely to use these districts effectively. It
has also been the case that developers have used these districts
speculatively, which had serious repercussions during the last
recession. Christopher Odinet develops an additional, and
important, critique of these districts. Odinet observes that these
districts obtain a lien on benefiting properties, and that this lien
takes priority over the liens of conventional lenders. Odinet then
argues that this super-priority should only be honored if the
district has served some substantial public purpose.
In this short Response, I agree with Odinet that these districts
are problematic, but wonder whether his solution is the best one.
This is because traditional lenders will generally know about

own.
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these districts before lending. Furthermore, his solution only kicks
in if there is an event of default, which is unusual, and thus, this
solution does not do much to counter the run of the mill socioeconomic stratification that these districts often enable. I argue
that an ex ante approach limiting the use of these districts
therefore seems preferable. I conclude with the argument that,
despite all their flaws, these districts should not be abolished
outright. Local government finance is a dynamic system and the
absence of any tool, even one prone to abuse, can have severe
consequences, as illustrated by the recent history of California.
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I. Introduction
We are usually aware of the general-purpose local
governments that we live and work in—primarily counties and
cities. We are often aware of some special-purpose local
government entities, particularly school districts. We are
probably not aware, however, of the many other special districts
that abound in most states—water districts, utility districts,
transportation districts, irrigation districts, and mosquito
abatement districts, to name a few. According to the Census
Bureau, in 2012, there were over 51,000 of such districts in the
United States—more than the over 39,000 general-purpose
governments.1
The Census Bureau undercounted. The Census Bureau’s
criteria leave out many special districts with significant powers
that are not sufficiently autonomous to make the Bureau’s list.2
1. 2012 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU GOV’T ORG. SUMMARY REP. 1 (2013).
2. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, G12-CG-ISD, INDIVIDUAL STATE DESCRIPTIONS:
2012, at vi (2013).
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For instance, in California, the Census Bureau counted 2,861
special districts (other than school districts),3 while California
itself, which has somewhat looser criteria, counted 4,711 of such
special districts—and all of those districts wielded significant
fiscal power.4
The existence of these districts can be viewed from a number
of perspectives. Looked at positively, they represent sensible
attempts to achieve economies of scale or bring expertise to bear
on a technical problem. Looked at negatively, such districts
greatly complicate democratic accountability, and, indeed, they
are often formed to evade limits, particularly as to incurring debt,
that have been imposed by the people on the forms of government
with which they are more familiar.
There is another kind of special district, one not accounted
for by either the Census Bureau or the California State
Controller, and this kind is perhaps as numerous as the specialpurpose districts just described. This is the sublocal tax or
assessment district.5 A sublocal district is typically formed by a
general-purpose local government, such as a city or county, but
can also be formed by other entities, particularly school districts.
Almost no one is aware of whether or not they live in “City of X,
Assessment District # 2012-1.”

3. Id. at 24.
4. 2012 CAL. STATE CONTROLLER SPECIAL DISTRICTS ANN. REP. iii.
5. How much more numerous is hard to say. As of 2012–2013, the
California Debt Investment and Advisory Commission counted 891 of one type
of these districts with debt outstanding. CAL. DEBT & INV. ADVISORY COMM’N,
CDIAC No. 14.11, CALIFORNIA MELLO-ROOS COMMUNITY FACILITY DISTRICTS
YEARLY FISCAL STATUS REP. 2012–2013 (2013). Not all of such districts have
outstanding debt, and in California, there are other kinds of very similar
districts. For more on trying to get a handle on the scope of these districts, see
Christopher K. Odinet, Super-Liens to the Rescue? A Case Against Special
Districts in Real Estate Finance, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 707, 735–46 (2015)
(setting forth the argument regarding special districts that the current Article
responds to); Darien Shanske, Note, Public Tax Dollars for Private Suburban
Development: A First Report on a National Phenomenon, 26 VA. TAX REV. 709,
711–12, 721–23 (2007) (providing a general analysis of Mello-Roos Tax Bonds).
See generally Sara C. Galvan, Wrestling with MUDS to Pin Down the Truth
About Special Districts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041 (2007) (discussing Texas
districts and similar normative arguments on both sides).
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The rationale for these sublocal districts is slightly different
from the rationale for more independent special-purpose entities,
such as water districts.6 Take a classic case: a road needs to be
built that connects a particular parcel of residential property to
the main town. Suppose as well, to make the case easier, that this
parcel is on a cul de sac and is at the end of the road. Without
doubt, this property benefits from this road more than anyone
else’s, likely in a monetizable way. When the owner sells her
property, now connected by a road, it will be worth more thanks
to this public improvement. But why should the rest of the public
pay for an improvement that so clearly benefits a particular
property? Should general tax dollars not be saved for projects
that provide more general benefits, such as, in this case, perhaps
the larger road that many people will use in order to get to the
smaller road that ends in the property owner’s cul de sac? A
sublocal district—usually called an assessment district—
responds to this concern by creating a mechanism whereby the
localizable value to be created by a public improvement can be
harnessed to build the improvement in the first place.
Thus, in this classic case, the government will place an
assessment on the owner’s property to pay for her share of the
road, say $10,000, payable $1,000 year over ten years. Because
the government is fairly certain that she will pay this $10,000 on
schedule, it can borrow against these expected payments on very
favorable terms in order to build the road. The government knows
that it will collect this assessment because it will be collected
along with property taxes, and, like a property tax, payment will
be secured by a lien on the owner’s property. As a tax lien, it will
take priority over other liens.7
The use of such sublocal financings was once very common,
with special assessment revenue making up a sizable portion of
the revenue of major cities.8 Currently, assessments are still
6. See generally Darien Shanske, Putting the California Constitution
(Back) to Work: A Blueprint for Clearing Legal Roadblocks to Proper
Infrastructure Finance, 54 ST. TAX NOTES 567 (2009) (developing this argument
further).
7. Odinet, supra note 5, at 749–50.
8. See Darien Shanske, Attention Carbon Auditors: There’s Low-Hanging
Fruit in the PAB Regs, 127 TAX NOTES 693, 705–07 (2010) (providing an
overview of “the admittedly long history of assessment financing”); Stephen
Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special
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common, though much less so, and predominantly they are used
to build infrastructure for new developments. Such speculative
use of assessments is not new and, in fact, is one of the reasons
their popularity declined during, and after, the Great
Depression.9 Therefore, one issue raised by these districts is to
what extent they encourage harmful speculation.
These sublocal districts have begun to resemble other kinds
of special districts in that they sometimes undertake limited
governmental functions within the new development area. Given
that these districts are put in place by developers for their own
benefit, the assumption by the district of governmental roles
poses normative challenges, such as whether it is appropriate for
some people to get “less” local democracy than others because of
how a developer once set up the community’s governance
structure.10 More fundamentally, there is the question of how the
tools of local democracy are used in establishing sublocal
districts. Because of the great flexibility usually available in
designing, forming, and confirming these districts, it is easy for
interested groups, beyond developers, to manipulate them.11 In
sum, there is a multi-headed democratic challenge posed by such
districts.12

Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 202 (1983)
(noting when special assessments originated in certain states and how they
became increasingly common financing devices in the early 19th Century).
9. Diamond, supra note 8, at 240.
10. See Odinet, supra note 5, at 751–53 (noting the strikingly low
participation in district board elections). See generally Nadav Shoked, QuasiCities, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1971 (2013) (explaining how special districts that
function like cities often undermine the objectives of local government law).
11. See Vladimir Kogan & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Problem With Being
Special: Democratic Values and Special Assessments, 14 PUB. WORKS MGMT. &
POL’Y 4, 30 (2009) (“[T]hough the institutional structures of modern assessments
do appear to prevent downward redistribution, they leave the system vulnerable
to strategic manipulation by large property owners and businesses, who can
more easily overcome the problems of collective action, in effect transforming
assessments into a potential tool for upward redistribution.”).
12. There are also federal tax challenges. See Darien Shanske, The Feds
Are Already Here: The Federal Role in Regulating Municipal Debt Finance, 33
B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 795, 805–09 (2014) (discussing a challenge actually
raised by the IRS). See generally Shanske, supra note 8 (arguing that these
districts should be challenged on other federal tax grounds).
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There are other related reasons one might be concerned
about such districts. If they are particularly good at building
infrastructure in undeveloped areas, as they seem to be, then
they are tools for sprawl pattern development. Sprawl pattern
development causes environmental and socio-economic problems.
After all, it will be the wealthy who are likely most able to selffinance the improvements that they would like, in splendid
isolation.13
II. Odinet’s Argument
In his analysis of these districts,14 Odinet places them in
much the same context as outlined above,15 though, crucially, he
adds one additional, novel, and very interesting critique: sublocal
districts used to finance real estate improvements cause problems
for traditional lenders because these districts obtain a lien that is
superior to the lien obtained by the traditional lender.16 Odinet’s
proposed judicial balancing test would mitigate this problem. His
test even takes into account many of the normative concerns with
these districts already adduced.17 Specifically, if challenged in
court, the priority of the development district loan would depend
on whether the district provided a community benefit that
justified this priority.
Odinet’s analysis fails, however, to justify its concern for
traditional lenders. Odinet explains the long history of special
districts,18 as well as their prevalence in many regions. It is,
therefore, difficult to see how traditional lenders are being
blindsided. Indeed, Odinet also explains why these districts are

13. See generally Darien Shanske, Above All Else Stop Digging: Local
Government Law as a Cause (and Solution) to the Current Financial Crisis, 43
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 663 (2010) (explaining how wealthy homeowners
generally use zoning and other tools to isolate themselves from other socioeconomic groups).
14. Odinet, supra note 5.
15. Odinet arguably assimilates these districts too much to special districts
more broadly.
16. Odinet, supra note 5, at 753–73.
17. Id. at 785–88.
18. Id. at 737–46.
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so favorable for developers.19 Because this is usually the case—for
example, where the district does not fail—the traditional lenders
likely share in the benefit that the developer enjoys through
being permitted to use a governmental structure to finance
essentially private development.20
It could be countered that sublocal financing of this sort is
inherently unstable, and thus, a downturn could materialize and
undermine traditional lenders. This is the concern, noted above,
that these districts are too likely to encourage speculation. Many
thought, including this commentator, that speculative landsecured districts would fall like dominoes during a prolonged
downturn,21 and so they did during the Great Recession in some
states, such as Florida, but not, for instance, in California. There
is a reason for this. Safeguards put in place—such as minimum
lien-to-value ratios and reserve funds—after the bust of the early
1990s in California effectively insulated many California
districts. There is, therefore, a way to mitigate the risk of these
districts enabling excessive speculation—other states, such as
Florida, should copy the California requirements.22
In developing the argument that there are financing
problems caused by these districts, Odinet emphasizes that the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) turned against sublocal
districts if the districts were established to finance solar panels
and other energy-saving improvements. These districts were part
of Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) programs.23
19. Id. at 773–78.
20. Odinet seems aware of this concern but does not directly address it. Id.
at 720 n.38.
21. Shanske, supra note 5, at 744–45.
22. See Robert W. Doty, The Readily Identifiable Riskiest Municipal
Securities: Due Diligence Does Make a Difference, 32 MUN. FIN. J. 63, 70–75
(2011) (contrasting default experiences in land-based financing in Florida and
California). Note that this is not to say that there is not room for improvement
with California Mello-Roos bonds. See, e.g., Keeley Webster, California Report
Takes Aim at Mello-Roos Bonds, THE BOND BUYER (July 23, 2015, 2:30 PM),
http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/regionalnews/california-report-takes-aim-atmello-roos-bonds-1079926-1.html (“An Orange County, Calif. civil grand jury
report criticized the oversight of $2.7 billion of debt issued by community
facilities districts in the county.”).
23. Odinet, supra note 5, at 772.
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Specifically, the FHFA declared that Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac would stop purchasing mortgages of properties within PACE
districts.24 This admittedly was a major event, essentially
destroying a (potentially) worthwhile local experiment,25 and the
super priority of these districts’ liens was a stated reason for this
policy.
Yet, it seems that Odinet gives this decision too much weight.
After all, Fannie and Freddie did not stop buying the mortgages
of the many homes in special districts generally, largely because
these districts are a well-known mechanism for financing
essential infrastructure. If a development district did not build
the roads and the sewers, then a developer would have to build
them and pass on a higher price to the home purchasers. In
contrast, it seems that the FHFA was responding, perhaps
hyperbolically, to policy and implementation concerns with the
program.26 For instance, unlike sewers, solar panels are not
considered essential by everyone, and so it is not clear what
subsequent homeowners would think about taking on a special
lien for solar panels. Also, though sewer lines do wear out, they
do not become obsolete in the same way that solar panels do. In
short, the FHFA seems to have been concerned about many other
matters other than the simple “super lien” status.27
24. Id.
25. For the critique, see generally Prentiss Cox, Keeping PACE?: The Case
Against Property Assessed Clean Energy Financing Programs, 83 U. COLO. L.
REV. 83 (2011) (arguing that the theory behind PACE is fundamentally flawed).
26. See generally id. (providing a more in-depth exploration of this
critique).
27. And the FHFA said as much:
First liens established by PACE loans are unlike routine tax
assessments and pose unusual and difficult risk management
challenges for lenders, servicers and mortgage securities investors.
The size and duration of PACE loans exceed typical local tax
programs and do not have the traditional community benefits
associated with taxing initiatives.
Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Statement on Certain Energy
Retrofit
Loan
Programs
(July
6,
2010),
http://www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/FHFA-Statement-on-CertainEnergy-Retrofit-Loan-Programs.aspx (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The federal government continues to be concerned with aspects of
PACE programs beyond the super-lien issue. For instance, in its latest guidance
on the issue, the federal government will insist that PACE programs not only
have subordinate liens, but that the PACE programs provide adequate

LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AS
INTEGRATED SYSTEM

199

The more powerful critiques of these districts are those
addressed in this Response’s introduction, those based on broader
considerations of political economy and justice.28 Odinet’s article
explicitly and implicitly develops these critiques. For instance,
Odinet discusses how the availability of these districts impel local
governments and developers to chase one another, looking for
supposed mutual win-wins, rather than search for projects that
aid the common good.29 Odinet also describes the kind of gilded
community that these districts are likely to finance30—these
districts will likely increase segregation along multiple
dimensions, not to mention sprawl. Odinet argues, reasonably,
that a court should consider whether a district is serving an
underserved community ex post when evaluating the priority of
the district’s lien.31 This Response argues that legislatures should
only permit such districts to advance broad social goals ex ante
through, for instance, rules on the kinds of infrastructure than
can be financed—for instance, not allowing districts to fund golf
course projects.32
There are two specific reasons this Response advocates an ex
ante approach. First, if we followed Odinet, we would make the
sublocal district lien subject to a balancing test, which would
destabilize the rights of both the traditional lenders and district
bondholders. That said, as argued above, we should not be overly
concerned about traditional lenders. Furthermore, other reforms
could lower the risk of default for these districts, so this clash of
priorities should not be a regular occurrence, even during an
consumer disclosures. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., GUIDANCE FOR USE OF
FHA FINANCING ON HOMES WITH EXISTING PACE LIENS AND FLEXIBLE
UNDERWRITING THROUGH ENERGY DEPARTMENT’S HOME ENERGY SCORE (2015).
28. See also Kenneth A. Stahl, Neighborhood Empowerment and the Future
of the City, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 939, 941–46 (2013) (critiquing assessment
districts). See generally Nadav Shoked, The New Local, 100 VA. L. REV. 1323
(2014) (providing a broader normative critique of micro-localism); Shanske,
supra note 13 (same).
29. Odinet, supra note 5, at 777–78.
30. The district in the opening example is to be used to finance a tennis
court, a golf course, and a swimming pool. Id. at 709–11; see also Shanske, supra
note 13, at 665–70 (providing an actual example).
31. Odinet, supra note 5, at 785–88.
32. Shanske, supra note 13, at 707–08.
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economic downturn. Thus, rights would be destabilized for little
reason. Therefore, in order to achieve Odinet’s normative goals,
an ex ante approach for assessing community benefit is more
promising. That said, I do not see why both an ex ante and ex
post solution could not be adopted at the same time.
III. Conclusion
One could argue that none of this is worth the trouble—that
neither Odinet’s reform nor this Response’s proffered reform
would be adequate. Even if subject to sensible restrictions, there
will always be a likelihood that powerful interest groups will
capture the use of sublocal district financing and push for its use
in more speculative projects—or at the very least, projects that
are normatively suboptimal. This might suggest dramatically
limiting such financing structures or taking the final step and
barring them outright. Such an approach would be a mistake for
two important reasons—or rather, one reason, with a positive and
a negative component. The negative component in particular has
not been well articulated up until this point.
First, the positive reason: the rationale for sublocal value
capture finance often holds true and, because of this, such
financings can serve as an important corrective for pathologies
that might otherwise develop in local politics. Public
infrastructure often disproportionately benefits a specific piece of
private property. When this benefit is specified with reasonable
precision, it not only allows for financing of infrastructure to
occur through the assessment mechanism, but it also encourages
a more frank evaluation of whether it should occur. For instance,
most property owners would agree that general tax dollars should
be used to improve the park across the street from their houses,
but they may not feel the same way if they are specially assessed
for that local improvement. If they do not agree with being
specially assessed for the improvement, then maybe the project is
not a good one. If most property owners support the assessment
however, and the assessment succeeds, then perhaps the general
park budget can be spent on a public pool for the whole town.
Regarding the negative reason for why we need sublocal
district financing, we should consider the scenario where a
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property owner does not want an improvement but is assessed for
one anyway. Though there are safeguards, in the end, the
assessment is a coercive financing tool. If it were not, then it
would not work properly. Very few projects command unanimous
consent. This point about coercion underscores that these
districts are just another governmental tool—not necessarily
better or worse in the abstract. A local government could use
general tax dollars to fund a park, use fees to fund a park, try to
impose some kind of regulatory mandate to compel a private
party to provide a park, so on and so forth. If the best tool is not
available, then the government will use a different one if it can—
like trying to use a screwdriver to hammer in a nail.
Using the wrong tool has costs—direct and indirect,
predictable and unpredictable. In the simple scenario above,
using the general park budget to fix up small neighborhood parks
prevents funding citywide amenities. Or perhaps the local parks
would not be fixed at all. If the park is not funded, then the direct
cost is a value-enhancing amenity that could have funded itself.
Various kinds of indirect costs are possible, such as the eventual
need for more policing of a park that no one uses because it is
rundown. On the other hand, if a sublocal park is funded with
general tax dollars there are also costs, such as the political
economy problem of different neighborhoods all clamoring for
general tax dollars to improve their local park. A follow-on
problem to this is that voters seem eventually to respond to
misuse of instruments.
There has been something of a natural experiment of this in
California. I will tell the story, which is, of course, controversial
in all respects, in outline. In 1978, via Proposition 13, the voters
of California permanently reduced the local property tax, which
had been the mainstay of local government.33 Without the ability
to use the property tax as they had before, California local
governments looked to other tools, particularly assessments, to
fund projects that the voters apparently wanted and that had
previously been funded with the property tax. In response to the
perceived aggressive use of assessments, California voters made

33.

See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (incorporating Proposition 13).
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it much harder to use assessments via Proposition 218 in 1996.34
In the wake of Proposition 13, California local governments also
turned more and more to fees. Proposition 26, passed in 2010,
made it harder to impose fees.35 Whether the accusations of
widespread abuse were fair in any of these cases is very much in
doubt, but it is not controversial that California local
governments felt compelled to use suboptimal mechanisms more
frequently as their better options were taken away from them.
The sad story of California’s systematic self-destruction of
the traditional tools of local public finance illustrates the dynamic
relationship between the various tools of public finance and local
political economies. Sublocal financing is essential, if for no other
reason than it is obviously appropriate in certain contexts. If a
different financing expedient is used when a sublocal assessment
district is the right tool, then the consequences will likely be
worse than tolerating an occasional default, a developer making
out like a bandit, or yet another way that the wealthy and
powerful can feather their nests. This is because, in the end, we
all benefit from a functional system of public finance. Thus,
making incremental reforms to sublocal financing mechanisms,
such that they are a little more equitable, is extremely
worthwhile—hence the importance of Odinet’s contribution.

34.
35.

See id. arts. XIIIC and XIIID (incorporating Proposition 218).
See id. arts. XIIIA, § 3 and XIIIC, § 1 (incorporating Proposition 26).

